عنوان مقاله [English]
Scholars have provided various responses to the dilemma of evil. George Mavrodes, in his book "Belief in God: A Study in the Epistemology of Religion," addresses the problem of evil. He links the issue of evil with "belief" and asserts that this problem is related to belief, which, in turn, is dependent on the person and has personal diversity. Based on this, the dilemma of evil should be considered among epistemic dilemmas, and not a logical one. Moreover, a useful and effective solution to the dilemma of evil is for it to be able to impact belief. The foundation of George Mavrodes' thought regarding the connection between evil and anthropocentric epistemology is his particular perspective regarding proof (burhān), emphasizing that the "proof" is generally dependent on the person. This paper examines and critiques George Mavrodes' perspective. The research findings indicate that the basis of George Mavrodes' thought in linking evil and anthropocentric epistemology is flawed. The reasons for this flaw are as follows: “the necessity of epistemological certainty for the proof and the inadequacy of psychological belief as well as the difference between humans in cognition and understanding”. Additionally, his response to the dilemma of evil is also unacceptable due to the following reasons: “the relativity of knowledge, the lack of a comprehensive standard for distinguishing good and evil, and the transformation of objective evil into subjective evil"