عنوان مقاله [English]
One of the theories presented in transcendent philosophy’s epistemology is that “the cognitive form is considered as the first object known by accident and the external object of knowledge is considered as the second object known by accident”. According to this theory, “knowledge” is an existential entity and an object known by essence. The cognitive form or the mental image is an essential entity (a quiddity) and an object known by accident. Likewise, the external object of knowledge that is perceived through the cognitive form is the second object known by accident. By elaborating this theory, it could be realized that this theory has structural as well as fundamental problems. Firstly, because, if the cognitive image is accepted as an essential entity (a quiddity) due to the fact that existence is only a mediator of subsistence for quiddity (and not the mediator of establishment) and also due to the fact that the criterion for conformity of knowledge with the known object is knowledge’s superior existence (and not the unity of quiddity), it can be realized that neither the cognitive form is the first object known by accident nor the external object of knowledge is the second object known by accident. Secondly, by proving the cognitive image as an existential object, the basis of this theory collapses. The cognitive form is the object known by essence, as asserted by Mulla Sadra.