عنوان مقاله [English]
In contemporary epistemology, sense-data signify direct sense-perception reported by the first person singular and in the present time. The most important issue about it is whether one can justify its content. The justification for sense-data is challenged by a dilemma that makes the issue spin over whether it is conceptual or none-conceptual.
In their paper, the authors have first demonstrated that some part of the dispute comes from the ambiguity of the application of the term and that its ontological position is not clear nor is it agreed upon. Then, relying on epistemological principles of Mulla Sara's philosophy, they have argued that the none-conceptualized contents of sense-data are the necessary prerequisite for the realization and fulfilment of the cognitive role of concepts. Since this content is not conceptualized and is thus presential knowledge -other than conceptual knowledge-, the outcome view would be an instance of none-conceptualism. In this view and in order to come free from strong skepticism and to defend rationality of empirical knowledge, we have resorted to an introspective definition of justification in which sense-data play a major role in representing the outside world. In the end, we have shown that such imperfect knowledge is far from absolute ignorance as to the world outside and from solipsism.