نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
استادیار و عضو هیئت علمی جامعه الزهرا(س)
عنوان مقاله [English]
This article deals with theories concerning the meanings of 'essential' in essentially good and bad and their relations with each other. Based on one theory, essential here means the same as that in isagogics, provided we accept that it is not necessary for a subject whose predicate is an essential part of it, to be an essence with genus and differentia. It can instead be a non-essence concept with a predicate tantamount to genus and differentia. If good and bad are among the essential properties of a subject then the 'essential' will denote the essential used in isagogics. 'Essential' will mean the essential of isagogics only when 'essential' is regarded as something 'considered' not as something ontological. A predication will be deemed as 'primarily essential' when good and bad are conceptually the same as their subjects. When essential means rational it implies that it is reason that understands the good and bad and when essential is used in the sense of real, it implies that good and bad are based on real expediency. Essential, however, when used as 'independent' it indicates that the good and bad of certain acts do not depend on the good and bad of other acts. Essential in the sense similar to what used in isagogics is reconcilable with rational, real, causal, independent and predicatively essential. The two meanings of essential in isagogics and essential similar in meaning to essential in isagogics are reconcilable with essential in the sense of rational, real, causal and independent, though these two meanings of essential cannot be reconciled with each other just anyone of them cannot be reconciled with the essential predication. If essential means the essential in isagogics then the predication will be a common one.