According to Kant, the emergence of antinomies stems from the very nature of theoretical reason’s engagement with metaphysical questions and thus unavoidable. That is to say, theoretical reason naturally and inevitably carries such illusions within itself, and there is no possible resolution to them. Accordingly, if the arguments of both sides (or even one side) of an alleged antinomy can be refuted, this would mean that the intellect has resolved the contradiction, thereby proving that the claim of the inherent, natural, and unavoidable nature of this contradiction is mistaken. This article examines the first of Kant’s four antinomies, specifically, the first part of the first antinomy, namely, the question of the temporal beginning of the world. This would determine whether it is truly an antinomy in which both sides are equally well-founded. To refute the antinomic status of the problem, it suffices to show that one side lacks the necessary soundness. However, the present study’s examination of both sides reveals that neither argument possesses the required rigor; thus, no genuine “two-sided” standoff is established, and the problem cannot properly be regarded as an antinomy.