Despite various qualitative and quantitative changes throughout life, every person perceives one’s numerical unity, which is referred to as personal identity. The bodily criterion is an approach that reduces persons to physical objects and considers bodily-physical continuity as the basis for personal identity.  It holds that humans recognize themselves and others through knowledge of the body, thereby inferring its identity. This article employs an analytical-critical method to examine the foundations, claims, and arguments of this theory. Several criticisms are raised against it, including: reliance on false assumptions, confusion between ontological and epistemological perspectives, replacing philosophical precision with common understanding, and confusion between first-person and third-person. Furthermore, one implication of this theory is that, even if the bodily criterion is loosely accepted for justifying personal identity in worldly life, it fails to account for identity in the afterlife. Consequently, this theory logically entails the denial of resurrection (maʿād).