It is commonly held that the necessity of divine attributes that stems from the philosophical principle of Wājib al-Wujūd (the Necessary Existent) being necessary in all aspects, applies exclusively to attributes of divine essence and does not extend to the attributes of divine action. However, Mulla Sadra considers it to be compatible with certain principles and conclusions of transcendent philosophy (such as the particular unity of existence and the negation of essence from contingents) and asserts that the attributes of action of the Wājib al-Wujūd are as necessary as His attributes of essence. He also provides arguments to support this claim. The significance and the foundational nature of this theory on one hand and the inconsistency of some of its implications with the apparent meanings of religious texts as well as the intuitive understanding of free will on the other prompted the author to critically assess the validity of these arguments. As necessitated by the principles of logic, there is no alternative but to formulate these arguments in a logical structure and this task was carried out with great precision, which itself stands as one of the strengths of this work. Thus, it has been clearly demonstrated that these arguments fail to substantiate the claim.