The absoluteness or relativism of moral propositions is a significant topic in moral philosophy, and the theory of "subjective considerations" (i’tibāriyāt) is one of the key perspectives of ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī. Given that this theory is ultimately based on reality and the universality of moral propositions is a requisite of moral realism, the theory of "subjective considerations" necessitates moral absolutism. This article, using a descriptive-analytical method, explains and analyzes the criterion of absoluteness and, by addressing possible objections, arrives at the following conclusions:

‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī's perspective is consistent with maximal moral realism, according to which the stability and variability of moral judgments depend on the stability or variability of the real source from which these judgments are abstracted, namely the nature of human species and its inherent, existential, stable, and common structure.
The absolutism arising from the theory of "subjective considerations" should be considered moderate absolutism, which acknowledges the changeability of certain moral judgments. However, these changes are not subject to individual emotions and preferences.
Although moderate absolutism leads to ontological or objective relativism, it differs from the well-known and rejected form of relativism, which is epistemological or subjective relativism.