Equating philosophical secondary intelligibles with logical secondary intelligibles, which is one of the essentials of the primacy of quiddity, leads to the assumption that their origins are identical. This assumption implies that the philosophical secondary intelligibles, like logical secondary intelligibles, rely on quiddities in their origin of attainment. This perception makes the method of attaining philosophical secondary intelligibles quiddity-based. Using an analytical-descriptive method, this article demonstrates that these two assumptions are wrong under the primacy of existence and have fundamental flaws. The existential nature of the philosophical secondary intelligibles causes its origin and the method of attainment to be existential. The instances of philosophical secondary intelligibles, according to the primacy of existence, possess externality, whereas quiddities have no share of externality, having conceptual identity and thingness. Hence, the origin of philosophical secondary intelligibles cannot be quiddities. With the change in perspective on the origin of philosophical secondary intelligibles, the method of attaining these concepts becomes different as well. The method proposed by ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī for attaining philosophical secondary intelligibles, based on knowledge by presence, aligns with the primacy of existence.