Assistant Professor and Faculty Member of Iranian Research Institute of Philosophy.
Abstract
The primacy of existence (aṣālat al-wujūd) serves as the basic and fundamental pillar of transcendent philosophy, and all the ingenuity of Mullā Ṣadrā is a direct result of it. Various interpretations of Mullā Ṣadrā about the posteriority and unreality of quiddity (māhiyyah) have led to the formation of a range of interpretations by the proponents of transcendent philosophy. This article examines the correct interpretation of the role and position of quiddity in four stages. At the first stage, the locus of conflict between the primacy of existence and the primacy of quiddity is elucidated. At the second stage, by accepting the primacy of existence, various interpretations of the position of quiddity are examined. The third stage addresses the impact of different interpretations of the primacy of existence on the theory of substantial motion. The fourth stage demonstrates which interpretation the theory of substantial motion fundamentally supports and endorses. The findings of the article, based on a descriptive-analytical approach, indicate that in the issue of the primacy of existence, considering quiddity as a mental concept (i'tibārī) is akin to a mirage, as interpreted by ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī. It appears that the theory of substantial motion, while confirming this interpretation, has a greater compatibility with it. Some researchers have suggested that accepting ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī's interpretation somehow negates nativism and leads to falling into idealism or perhaps nominalism. However, it must be noted that: Firstly, in this interpretation, the external existence of physical universal is not only not negated, but it also has a greater compatibility with the foundations of the primacy of existence. Secondly, the interaction of the mind with objective reality demonstrates that quiddity is not solely a construct of the mind, but due to existence of a real source of abstraction, it signifies the external reality.
jamebozorgi, M. J. (2024). ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī's Perspective on the Primacy of Existence and its Compatibility with the Theory of Substantial Motion. Journal of Hikmat-e-Islami, 10(39), 103-121.
MLA
mohamad jafar jamebozorgi. "‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī's Perspective on the Primacy of Existence and its Compatibility with the Theory of Substantial Motion". Journal of Hikmat-e-Islami, 10, 39, 2024, 103-121.
HARVARD
jamebozorgi, M. J. (2024). '‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī's Perspective on the Primacy of Existence and its Compatibility with the Theory of Substantial Motion', Journal of Hikmat-e-Islami, 10(39), pp. 103-121.
VANCOUVER
jamebozorgi, M. J. ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī's Perspective on the Primacy of Existence and its Compatibility with the Theory of Substantial Motion. Journal of Hikmat-e-Islami, 2024; 10(39): 103-121.