نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
عنوان مقاله English
نویسندگان English
This study examines ijtihād as an intellectual virtue. Ijtihād, which constitutes one of the foundational pillars of Islamic jurisprudence and the derivation of legal rulings, is analyzed not merely as a process of reasoning, but also as an innate disposition (malakah nafsāniyyah) and an intellectual virtue. Employing a descriptive-analytical method, the research elucidates the philosophical foundations of ijtihād and its relation to other intellectual and ethical virtues such as sound reasoning, quick comprehension, clarity of mind, etc, as well as practical wisdom understood as ethical moderation. The article first discusses the definition and status of ijtihād within Imāmī jurisprudence. It then investigates ijtihād as an intellectual virtue through a virtue-centered framework, clarifying the role of practical wisdom in this process. Furthermore, it analyzes the influence of non-cognitive states and moral characteristics upon the derivation of legal rulings, as well as the nature of epistemic reliance upon others (epistemic taqlīd). This study, by emphasizing the concept of justice as a form of practical wisdom and as a condition for ijtihād, seeks to distance itself from the juristic preference (istiḥsān) grounded in non-cognitive states and tries to focus upon Shiʿi rationality. The research findings demonstrate that ijtihād is more than a tool for deriving rulings; it is an intellectual virtue formed through the balance of reason, experience, and religious texts. Through virtues in the domain of intellect, such as precision, rational deliberation, and ethical qualities, the mujtahid is able to derive legal rulings in accordance with the conditions of time and place. This approach significantly contributes to the dynamism of Islamic jurisprudence and its capacity to adapt to social and cultural transformations.
کلیدواژهها English
- قرآن کریم
