Following the development of the discussion on the three modalities and quiddative possibility in Islamic philosophy, the question of whether the Necessary Being (wājib al-wujūd) possesses quiddity has become a subject of debate. The dominant position throughout the history of Islamic philosophical tradition maintains that the Necessary Being is devoid of quiddity. In contrast, some thinkers have challenged this view. Among contemporary scholars, Ustad Fayyazi, based on his foundations regarding the primacy of existence and his interpretation of the meaning of quiddity, opposes this prevailing position. Since he regards the Necessary Being as distinct from created beings and as possessing existential determination and individual characteristics, he concludes that the Necessary Being, like contingent beings, has quiddity. Just as species such as human beings and cattle possess quiddity, the Necessary Being also possesses quiddity, with the difference that the quiddity of the Necessary Being is infinite in accordance with its existence. By drawing upon certain narrations, Ustad Fayyazi considers his view as supported by both rational and transmitted arguments. However, a crucial point overlooked in this account is that mere distinction, existential determination, or individual characteristics do not suffice to establish quiddity in a thing. If we maintain a distinction between quiddities and philosophical concepts (just as he does), quiddity cannot be affirmed solely on the basis of particular determination or individual characteristics. Moreover, the cited narrations do not adequately support the intended conclusion.