Contradictions in an Actual Thing Infinitely Existed
(A Critical Study)
mohammad sadegh
kavyani
A PhD. Student at Markaz Takhasusi of Islamic Philosophy.
author
ali
abbasi
. An assistant professor and a faculty member at al-Mustafa International University.
author
mohammd
rezapoor
. An assistant professor and a faculty member at al-Mustafa International University.
author
text
article
2019
per
The infinitely existing of an actual thing, many thinkers hold, brings about lots of influential contradictions on the fate of a few important philosophical issues. These issues are: the impossibility of regressio ad infinitum, the finiteness of the spatial dimensions of the world, and the temporal beginning of the world. Viewing the importance of the issue, those contradictions have always called the attention of many Muslim and western thinkers. Recognizing the reasons for those contradictions as valid, some thinkers have gone to deny the actual existence of infinite things in the objective world. On the contrary, some contemporary mathematicians and philosophers hold that all those reasons fail to prove anything. As the authors have suggested a detailed differentiation about the issue, they have first briefed those contradictions in short and then examined the articulated comments on the issue. The final conclusion is that were there really causal and real concomitance among different things, then the infinity of those things entails many contradictions; otherwise, such contradictions would not happen. Accordingly, the temporal and spatial infinity of the world is possible.
Journal of Hikmat-e-Islami
Publication Information
2423-5105
5
v.
شماره4- پیاپی 19 (زمستان 97)
no.
2019
9
34
https://fhi.hekmateislami.com/article_88304_a8e7eced46e6d3e50b3d29cbc0830f42.pdf
The Validity of Documentation to Ibn Abi al-Hadid about Imamate Issues
afdolmajid
zahadat
An assistant professor and a faculty member at al-Mustafa International University
author
text
article
2019
per
In their study of Imamate issues, the Shiite scholars have referred to the words of Ibn Abi al-Hadid, the Sunni Mu’tazilite (D. 656 A. H.); nonetheless, some Sunni scholars have accused him of being a Shiite, a neophyte, an extremist, or even an obstinate Shiite. Now, the question is: are the words of such a person (Ibn Abi al-Hadid) valid and strong enough to convince the opponent in the course of Imamate debates? In what presented here, the author has drawn the conclusion that although he is a Mu’tazilite, in his The Commentary on Nahju al-Balaghah, Ibn Abi al-Hadid has strengthened the Sunnite and Ash’arite positions in the Imamate debates such as, that there is no clear text on the Imamate of Imam Ali (PBUH), that he is not the instant caliph after Holy Prophet (PBUH), and that infallibility was not specified as a condition for Imamate. Therefore, knowing him as a Shiite is either due to the lack of perfect knowledge about Ibn Abi al-Hadid or to the confusion of using terms. However, what matters is to follow the sound argument, rather than to blindly embrace the word of somebody. Thus, being a Sunni or Shiite does not work in the embracement of a proved and well-founded word. The motive of those biased Sunnis who have accused him might be Ibn Abi al-Hadid’s belief in Imam Ali’s priority over others, that he libeled Mu’awiah, or to nullify his criticisms against some Sunni beliefs, or to invalidate the Shiite documentations, or in order to refer to some of his words against the Shiite .
Journal of Hikmat-e-Islami
Publication Information
2423-5105
5
v.
شماره4- پیاپی 19 (زمستان 97)
no.
2019
57
78
https://fhi.hekmateislami.com/article_88311_ad3c971703b032ce741f77d4540a0aca.pdf
The Relation between Soul and Temperament in the Islamic Philosophy and the Philosophy of Mind
mansoor
mahdavi
A Ph D. student of philosophy at Baqir al-Ulum University
author
Mhammad Taqi
Yosofi
A Ph D. of Islamic philosophy at Baqir al-Ulum University
author
text
article
2019
per
Mind and discussions about it are the most significant and valuable ones in philosophy. Hence and due to the emergence of philosophy of mind, the study of mind and its relation to mental temperament are very important. As the genealogy of this study, the belief in man’s temperament might be traced back to ancient physics and peripatetic philosophy, thus can be studied in the tradition of Islamic philosophy, too. In such a tradition, however, the mind-temperament dualism might be vindicated through many arguments. Accordingly, all Muslim philosophers have regarded mind and temperament two separate issues. Nonetheless, despite its nature of study that concerns physics, the study of temperament has not been proposed for discussion in the philosophy of mind, and yet somehow, it has an approach of physicalism. This negligence might be due to the difference of nature between ancient and modern medicine that marginalized the issue. Consequently, the question of temperament cannot be found in modern physics, thus their psychology went different.
Journal of Hikmat-e-Islami
Publication Information
2423-5105
5
v.
شماره4- پیاپی 19 (زمستان 97)
no.
2019
173
191
https://fhi.hekmateislami.com/article_88326_a2de87f7de497bd88e10ebb1e162420e.pdf
Imam Khomeini on the Justifiability of Bodily Resurrection and the Criticism of Tafkiki School
mohammadreza
Ershadinia
. An associate professor at Hakim Sabzewari University
author
text
article
2019
per
Imam Khomeini’s view on the justification for bodily resurrection has demonstrated the competence of Mulla Sadra’s metaphysics and its profound groundwork for the explanation and consolidation of religious beliefs, thus his dynamic thought in different cycles of time. There are some people, however, who by throwing doubts and distorting Khomeini’s views try to ascribe anti-Sadraism to him, particularly in the theory of bodily resurrection. Imam Khomeini’s account and documented criticism of Sadra’s bodily resurrection and his defense of Mulla Sadra’s groundwork of metaphysics not only dispel the doubtful claims of Tafkiki school people, but also pave the way for others to benefit from Sadra’s noble metaphysics. The late Khomeini’s groundwork of metaphysics is identical with that of Sadra’s; however, his justification mostly rests on religious motifs, i.e. verses of the Qur’an and Islamic traditions. Imam Khomeini has followed up Sadra’s multifaceted view on resurrection in its epistemological ontological and psychological dimensions regarding it competent enough to settle the how-question of the issue. In the epistemological dimension, he passes by the superficial inquiry and rejects the resurrection of main elements theory as a necessary prerequisite for his view. In its ontological dimension, he pays serious attention to the graded existence of the soul in this world and the next and the promotion of body from potentiality and corporeality to its actuality and being incorporeal. In its psychological dimension, he proposes the how-origination of soul in its different phases and the body-mind relation as the main prerequisite to understanding the how-question of bodily resurrection .
Journal of Hikmat-e-Islami
Publication Information
2423-5105
5
v.
شماره4- پیاپی 19 (زمستان 97)
no.
2019
35
56
https://fhi.hekmateislami.com/article_88305_03428677351796026e924e3a8c164655.pdf
The Ontological Analysis of Mentally Constructed Entities
Abdollah
fathy
An assistant professor and a faculty member at Imam Khomeini Institute.
author
mohammad
fanaei
professor and a faculty member at Imam Khomeini Institute.
author
text
article
2019
per
When we come to speak about current issues of life, we realize that our speech is littered with many things the philosophical reality of which demands precise examination unprecedented. These issues have occupied our life altogether such as, address, home, place of work, money, organization, bank account, seminary school, university, president, inflation, social traditions and institutes, and law. Such issues are not like concrete or physical realities bearing existential characteristics; rather, they are called mentally constructed entities by the intellectuals. Generally speaking, the most difficult philosophical inquiry about those issues is their ontological analysis; i.e. can we consider them as the concrete entities in the outside world? Where is the residence of such issues? Is it inside or outside the mind? Were it the former, is it the mind of the agent or that of those who have accepted them? What does mentality mean when we say that something is mentally constructed? What is the relation between such things and other mental, natural, or physical things? Having followed up their study in the framework of philosophical analysis and according to the principles of Mulla Sadra’s metaphysics, the authors have arrived at the conclusion that mentally constructed entities are realities dependent on valid agents; they exist through the causa subsistendi, though. In this regard, there is no external plurality between mental act of construction and entities mentally constructed. The reality of mental constructions is no more than a shadowy existence to the mental act of construction
Journal of Hikmat-e-Islami
Publication Information
2423-5105
5
v.
شماره4- پیاپی 19 (زمستان 97)
no.
2019
79
101
https://fhi.hekmateislami.com/article_88321_fe7f95d6d1074e57fe4788a73314b1be.pdf
The Argument from Viability for the Immorality of Abortion
halime
yaghoobnejad
An M.A. student of philosophy at Mufid University
author
Alireza
Alebouyeh
An assistant professor and a faculty member at The Islamic Culture and Sciences Research Center.
author
text
article
2019
per
Abortion is one of the controversial issues in medical ethics. This operation has come across many for or against answers each of which has some arguments for its view. One for-argument says that because the fetus does not have a personality, i.e. personal characteristics, it is not considered as a person; rather it is merely a potential person. Thus destroying the fetus is morally right.
Stephan Schwarz is among those who have argued against abortion; he has directed attention to the difference between being a person and having personal functions. Thus considering functional capabilities, the fetus is a person. He holds that from the very moment of conception the fetus becomes a person with its moral right and position; it may not function as a person, though.
One of his arguments that the fetus is a person comes from viability (continuance of existence). In what follows, the authors have examined this argument. Due to the similarities between this argument and those of species essence and slippery slope -considered identical by some people- they have differentiated that argument from these two ones .
Journal of Hikmat-e-Islami
Publication Information
2423-5105
5
v.
شماره4- پیاپی 19 (زمستان 97)
no.
2019
103
126
https://fhi.hekmateislami.com/article_88322_0019d2404c3ce2fdd46500424897ff59.pdf
Ayatulla Fayyazi on the "Existence" as primary or Secondary Intelligibles
Mahdi
Jamali
student of Philosophy of social sciences at Imam Khomeini Institute of Education and Research.
author
text
article
2019
per
Primary intelligibles, philosophers hold, are general concepts whose referents exist in the external world. On the contrary, secondary intelligibles or mentally constructed concepts do not have referents in the outside world. People like Suhrawardi who believe in the real primacy of quiddity consider existence as a secondary concept because they hold that existence is merely constructed by the mind and thus is not real. On the other hand, after Mulla Sadra who vindicated the real primacy of existence, his followers were to consider existence and its attributes as primary concepts, because according to them it is existence that really exist by itself in the external world, rather than the quiddity. Nevertheless, they still believe that existence and its attributes are secondary intelligibles. A few solutions have been proposed to dispel that contradiction. Ayatullah Fayyazi holds that the correct view is that existence as an infinitive is a secondary intelligible and mentally constructed, but as a verbal noun is a primary one and real. Other views are: 1-the general concept of existence qua its generality is not real; 2- the fake concept of existence -viewing the fact that the reality of existence does not come into the mind- is regarded as a secondary intelligible; 3- the secondary philosophical intelligible is interpreted as a concept lacking any independent referent, or as concept secondarily understood, or as a concept made through comparison. All those solutions are invalid .
Journal of Hikmat-e-Islami
Publication Information
2423-5105
5
v.
شماره4- پیاپی 19 (زمستان 97)
no.
2019
127
145
https://fhi.hekmateislami.com/article_88323_8734ade2a8b03451903c2222cf5493e1.pdf
The Examination of Different Aspects of Occultation and its ties to the Imam’s Appearance
Hussein
elahinezahd
An associate professor and a faculty member at the Research Center of Islamic Culture and Sciences.
author
text
article
2019
per
In what follows, the author has examined the concept of Occultation and its ties to the Imam’s appearance. In order to study the issue, one is to analyze different aspects and constituents of Occultation. The earlier conducted researches suggest that Occultation has three aspects: the what question, the how question, and the why question of it, each of which demonstrates various concepts. In the course of this research, the first aspect goes to analyze the concept of Occultation, the second aspect explains how it happened in its epistemic and physical forms, and the third one proposes issues such as “the cause, wisdom, and goal of Occultation”. The third aspect suggests that its cause is due to the behavior of people, its goal concerns Divine action, and its wisdom belongs to its characteristics and properties. From among the three constituents, obviously, the why question of Occultation has the most ties to the issue of Imam’s appearance. And from among the three concepts of why questions, the concept of cause has the most ties to the happening of appearance. Generally speaking, Imam’s appearance happens when Occultation is gone, which might only go when the causes of occultation is gone.
Journal of Hikmat-e-Islami
Publication Information
2423-5105
5
v.
شماره4- پیاپی 19 (زمستان 97)
no.
2019
147
171
https://fhi.hekmateislami.com/article_88324_8703ad7ee99ec8e89684ccc53444a68e.pdf
The Reconstruction of Jurjani’s Argument for the simplicity of Derivatives
(A Critical Study)
sayed Ahmad
Hosseini
A Ph D. student of Islamic philosophy at Tarbiate Mudarres University.
author
text
article
2019
per
The simplicity of derivatives that began as a controversy between Razi and Jurjani served Mulla Sadra somehow as one principle to understand his groundwork of the real primacy of existence and the relation between existence and what exists. Jurjani’s argument for the simplicity of derivatives has met many objections, but later scholars came to reconstruct the argument in order to get rid of those objections. This paper goes to examine those reconstructions.
To demonstration that a derivative is simple and has only one single part of meaning owes to the proving of two claims negative (that the subject -or agent- and relation to the subject are external to the concept of a derivative) and positive (the explanation that derivatives are different from their roots). The examination of those reconstructions is, indeed, the study whether those arguments succeed or fail in their attempts to prove the two above claims. In his attempt to defend Jurjani’s position, Sabziwari has embarked upon the reconstruction seemingly successful in proving that “the subject is external to the concept of the derivative”, like Jurjani’s argument does. Nonetheless, the reconstructions made by Ha’iri Yazdi, and Gharawi Isfahani are open to criticism due to their neglect of some aspects.
The negative claim comprises two parts, that the subject and relation to the subject are external to the concept of the derivatives. However, Jurjani’s argument and Sabziwari’s reconstruction can only work in proving that the subject is external to the concept of the derivatives, but the relation to the subject is not. Moreover, the two accounts fail to prove the positive claim, i.e. the relation of “negatively conditioned and none-conditioned” between the root and the subject. Other reconstructions even fail to prove that the subject is external as one of the two parts of the negative claim. Evidently they have failed to prove the other part of the negative claim (that the relation to subject is external) and the positive claim, either
Journal of Hikmat-e-Islami
Publication Information
2423-5105
5
v.
شماره4- پیاپی 19 (زمستان 97)
no.
2019
195
221
https://fhi.hekmateislami.com/article_88327_7d6576b89e426aa7d44f968b7d916376.pdf